Articles with tag: Ios
POSTED BY: Rayd Debbas / 17.02.2021

Canary Mail and MailCore2 library missing certificate validation check on IMAP STARTTLS

CENSUS ID:CENSUS-2021-0001
CVE ID:CVE-2021-26911
Affected Products:Canary Mail for iOS and MacOS versions 3.20 and 3.21, MailCore2 library version 0.6.4
Class:Improper Certificate Validation (CWE-295)
Discovered by:Rayd Debbas

CENSUS identified that the Canary Mail software in versions 3.20 and 3.21 (and possibly previous versions) is missing a certificate validation check when performing an IMAP connection configured with STARTTLS. This vulnerability allows man-in-the-middle attackers to collect a victim user's email credentials (while these are communicated to the IMAP service), to access email messages and perform other IMAP actions to the victim account, but also to modify email messages while in-transit to Canary Mail. CENSUS strongly recommends to iOS and MacOS users of the Canary Mail software to update to version 3.22, as this version carries a fix for the aforementioned vulnerability. The same vulnerability also affects other software that are based on the MailCore2 library (including version 0.6.4). A patch for the library is publicly available, however this has not been incorporated yet into an official library release.


POSTED BY: CENSUS / 18.04.2019

CanSecWest 2019

CENSUS has participated in this year's CanSecWest conference with a presentation by Director of Research Patroklos Argyroudis on reverse engineering the Apple iOS sandbox kernel extension entitled Vs com.apple.security.sandbox.


POSTED BY: Patroklos Argyroudis / 18.04.2019

Vs com.apple.security.sandbox (CanSecWest 2019)

On March 20th 2019 I presented at the 2019 CanSecWest conference a talk on reverse engineering the Apple iOS sandbox kernel extension entitled Vs com.apple.security.sandbox. I really enjoyed the conference, traveling to Vancouver, and meeting a lot of people interested in my research.


POSTED BY: George Chatzisofroniou / 01.02.2018

The Known Beacons Attack (34th Chaos Communication Congress)

The recent key reinstallation attacks (KRACK) against the WPA2 protocol revealed how an adversary can easily eavesdrop, and in some cases tamper, a Wi-Fi connection secured by the WPA2 protocol. At the same time, Wi-Fi automatic association attacks achieve a similar result (man-in-the-middle position) not by attacking the WPA2 protocol directly but by enforcing Wi-Fi clients to join a rogue Access Point.