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MOBILE APPS PANORAMA 2016

# WELCOME TO THE JUNGLE (OF MOBILE APPS)



**CENSUS**  
IT Security Works



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# ABOUT CENSUS S.A.

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- We deliver security assessment services to customers worldwide
  - Including Mobile App Assessments for all major platforms
- We build on heavy-duty IT security research. Recent Android highlights include:
  - Five Android 6.x “stagefright” vulnerabilities (2016)
  - Multiple Android 5.x ART optimisation vulnerabilities (Hack-in-the-box Amsterdam 2015)
  - Android support for Google’s “honggfuzz” fuzzer (2015)
  - Many recent exploits for Android are based on our “jemalloc” exploitation work (Black Hat USA 2012)




# WHERE THE WILD THINGS ARE (PART I)

- Vulnerabilities in the App stack
  - App vulnerabilities
  - Framework / Third Party Component vulnerabilities
  - Platform vulnerabilities



# WHERE THE WILD THINGS ARE (PART 2)

- Vulnerabilities in external services
  - Mobile Gateway / Web API vulnerabilities
  - Third party service (e.g. maps, app tracing etc.) vulnerabilities



# THE WILD KINGDOM



## Remote Attacker

- May perform attacks on the Web API
- May perform local attacks through malware
- May perform attacks requiring a specific position (man-in-the-middle, NFC etc.)



## Thief

- Has physical access to the device for an extended period of time
- May collect unprotected (unencrypted) data from the device storage and memory
- May perform impersonation attacks



## Valid User

- Has physical access to the device and rightful access to the app services
- May reverse engineer the app
- May run a modified version of the app



## Third Party Service Provider

- May create a denial of service condition to the app
- May receive sensitive information from the app
- May sometimes be able to inject data / code to the app

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# EXAMPLE #1: A REMOTE ATTACKER THREAT

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- Banking App allows overlays from other apps and uses SMS authorization (mTAN)
  - The ZitMo (2010) and Android.SpyAgent.SI (2016) malware target such mobile banking apps
  - They capture and forward all information needed to perform a successful bank transaction
    - user credentials
    - SMS token
  - NIST no longer recommends two factor authentication via SMS
  - Field experts can help in the quick identification and mitigation of such issues

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# EXAMPLE #2: A THIEF THREAT

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- App framework uses the wrong API during TouchID authentication
  - An iOS mobile banking app uses the above framework to authenticate users
  - A thief could have exploited the above flaw to bypass authentication
  - An in-depth analysis of the application is required to identify such threats

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# EXAMPLE #3: A VALID USER THREAT

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- A Game App performs business-critical actions on the device but employs no integrity protections
  - Users could modify and install an ad-free and/or cheating-friendly version of the game
  - This type of security issue is introduced at the *design* phase
  - If important logic must enter the app code then integrity protections must be applied

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# CHALLENGES IN HANDLING THREATS

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- No time (“Traction now, security later!”)
  - Fixing a security issue after release comes with an increased cost / impact
- No budget (“Our clients don't mind!”)
  - Quality is the definitive attribute of leaders in competitive markets
- No expertise (“Is this really a threat?”)
  - Gain the needed insight through Security Consultancy services

# SECURE SDLC

- Incorporates security checks by experts in all phases of the SDLC
- Early identification and mitigation of security risks
- Minimizes the security-related costs of projects



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# THANK YOU!

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- Photo Material

- *Slide 1 photo by Jon Olav Eikenes (Flickr ID “jonolave”)*
- *Slide 3 photo by “eclecctica” (Flickr ID “ecclectica”)*
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